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AN

AUTHENTIC ACCOUNT

OP

Mr. CANNING'S POLICY

WITH RESPECT TO THE

CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER

OP

PORTUGAL,

IN REPLY TO

* OBSERVATIONS ON THE PAPERS LAID BEFORE PARLIAMENT.'

LONDON:
J. HATCHARD AND SON, 187, PICCADILLY.

MDCCCXXX.

H^MRY MORSE STEfHEM.

tONDON:
PRINTED BY T. BRETTELL, RUPERT STREET, HAYMARKET.

AN

AUTHENTIC ACCOUNT

OF

Mr. CANNING'S POLICY,

W IT HiN these few days a pamphlet has appeared (under
the title of " Observations on the Papers lately submitted to
Parliament upon the subject of the Affairs of Portugal"),
in which there is a great deal to praise, but likewise a great
deal to condemn.

From the very accurate information displayed by the
Writer, in some parts of his Observations, we should
strongly suspect, that he possessed far more knowledge than
could be derived from the papers on which he comments.
Indeed, the internal evidence which corroborates this suspi-
cion is so strong, that we cannot help entertaining it, not-
withstanding the apparently incidental observation in the
first page, that to the originals, " the Ministry'' have ^^ an
exclusive access.*"

6

it >:}iis^upppsition be correct, it is not creditable to the
Author ; for although, if dates are attended to, the Par-
liamentary Papers do not justify the false colouring which,
in the first twenty-three pages, has been given to Mr.
Canning's conduct, yet that false colouring is tenfold more
culpable, if given by a person who has more knowledge
than they afford.

But whatever information he may possess, we have no wish
to conceal the fact, that we are acquainted with the whole of
the correspondence relative to the negotiations carried on by
Sir Charles Stuart, although upon the latter portion of the
Parliamentary Papers we, perhaps, have less knowledge than
the Writer himself. We have also seen copies of some
private letters of Mr. Canning's upon this subject, whereby
we are enabled to give to the world a true history of these
much-misrepresented transactions.

That history shall be taken up from the death of the
King of Portugal, as being the first event in the series
connected with the establishment of a constitutional Go-
vernment in Portugal.

His Most Faithful Majesty died on the 10th of March,
1826. The instant that his demise was ascertained, a packet
set sail from Lisbon to announce the event to Don Pedro,
at Rio de Janeiro, where the vessel arrived on, or before, the
80th of April. It was not till the 27th of March that the
news arrived in London ; and, of course, before any instruc-
tions could be framed for the direction of the British Repre-
sentative at Rio, some days elapsed. The consequence of
this unavoidable delay was, that before there was time for
Mr. Canning"*s sentiments to be known at Rio, the measures

adopted by the Emperor, upon the death of his father, were
settled, and were put beyond his power to alter, by the de-
parture for Portugal of the individual (Sir Charles Stuart)
whom His Imperial Majesty had selected to be the bearer of
his decrees. Whatever, therefore, those decrees might be,
one thing is quite clear, that they could not have been, by
possibility, suggested by the British Government ; and as far
as Sir Charles Stuart is concerned, he asserts, that he gave
no such advice, but "recommended another, and a different
course.

The grant of the charter, therefore, whether for good or
for evil, cannot be ascribed either to the counsels of the Bri-
tish Government, or, as far as the Government knew, to those
of Sir Charles Stuart.

The Emperor having determined to grant this charter,
" stated his wish to Sir Charles Stuart to send^' it to Lisbon,
'^ through his hands, as Portuguese Plenipotentiary.*" Sir
Charles describes himself " as somewhat startled by this mark
*' of confidence, which he endeavoured to avoids by expressing
" his doubts how far such a course would meet the approba-
** tion of his Court'' — declaring, " that the request em-
^^ barrassed him very much, since he was wholly unpre-
" pared to take upon himself so heavy a responsibility*.""

Notwithstanding, however, his doubts, his embarrassment,
and his dread of responsibility, he consented, without wait-
ing for instructions, to comply with the Emperor's wishes,
and to convey the Constitution to Lisbon.

The news of the abdication of Don Pedro in favour of

* Vide Parliamentary Papers^ No. III.

8

his daughter, and of the grant of the charter, reached Mn
Canning through France on the 25th of June, but it was
not till twelve days after that Mr. Canning received Sir
Charles Stuarf s own report of this proceeding.

On the 12th of July, Mr. Canning communicated to
Sir Charles the King's approbation of His Excellency"*s
" having consented (under the peculiar circumstances of
" his situation in Brazil)^ to be the bearer of the Em-
" peror''s decrees."" The same dispatch which conveyed
this approbation, hkewise conveyed to Sir Charles an order
to " return home,'*'' in order to avoid even the appearance
of " interfering with the free agency of Portugal.''^

In a private letter of Mr. Canning''s, to a distinguished
diplomatist, dated July 25, 1826, which letter must there-
fore have been written before Mr. Canning had heard of Sir
Charles's arrival at Lisbon, and consequently of what
might have been his proceedings there, Mr. Canning's mo-
tives for taking this view of the subject are thus explained : —
'' It is strictly true," he says, " that Sir Charles had no
" authority to act in any matter of this kind ; and that his
" having done so is not only without my instructions, but
*>' against my wishes. I cannot, however, ]\i^X[y disapprove
" of what he has done (so far as I am yet acquainted with
" his proceedings, and with the limits he may intend to put
>f to them), although you see how anxiously I labour to cut
.'^ them short, and to bring him home. I cannot justly dis-
" approve, because I did permit him, advisedly, to become
^' the negotiator of the treaty of Separation and Independ-
^' ence, as Plenipotentiary of His Most Faithful Majesty,
^' As a counterpart to this undertaking for the behoof of

" Portugal, Stuart was at liberty to charge himself, on his
'* return to Europe, with any communication which Don
" Pedro might wish to make to his Father or his Government.
" It is hardly necessary to say, that the present state of
'^ things was not in contemplation when my instructions
" were given. It was therefore not included in them ; but
" neither was it excluded,

" I have, therefore, thought it best at once to exonerate
" him from all blame on this account ; and, doing so, I have
" thought it right further to defend what he has done (so
'' far as I yet know what he has done) to other Govern-
" ments. I do not mean to say that I should not have
" been much better pleased if he had declined the commis-
" sion altogether, but I have nevertherless approved of his
" conduct, couphng only that approbation with his imme-
^' diate recall.

" The knowledge of these details will enable you to assert
" more confidently the fact, that I never authorized, and that
" I regret, though I cannot condemn. Sir Charles Stuart's
'^ agency in this affair. "

It appears, then, that Mr. Canning did not withhold
from Sir Charles the approbation of his Government, be-
cause he thought that the so doing would be unjust towards
Sir Charles. But he did not the less lament the act, be-
cause he well knew that it would probably excite the jealousy
of the continental Powers, at the same time that it was
certain to raise in the minds of the Portuguese constitution-
alists exaggerated hopes of British assistance, which it
would be extremely difficult fully to realize, but which it
would nevertheless be most cruel to disappoint.

10

The charter being thus granted by Don Pedro, and
brought over by Sir Charles Stuart, Mr. Canning at once
saw that, since the acceptance by Portugal of the charter was
made a condition of Don Pedro''s abdication, if the charter
were rejected, its rejection would undo all that he had been
labouring during the preceding two years to effect, and had
at last accomplished, through the agency of Sir Charles
Stuart, viz.: the settlement of the disputes between Portugal
and Brazil, which had been adjusted by the Treaty of Separa-
tion and Independence. He likewise considered it better for
Portugal that the Government should at once accept Don
Pedro's constitution, than for it to convoke the ancient
Cortes ; these two courses being the only alternatives be-
tween which it appears that the Regency had the power to
make an option. " I am, " he said, in a private letter to Sir
William A'Court, " for that one of the two which will pre-
serve peace,*" And it appears, by the published dispatch,
that he was convinced that " the rejection of the charter
" in Portugal would revive all the difficulties that had just
" been overcome, and would place the crown of Portugal,
" and not the crown only but the monarchy itself, of Brazil
" in danger."

These being Mr. Canning's opinions, he communicated
them to Sir Charles Stuart, and likewise at the same time
directed Sir William A'Court " to make the general sub-
^' stance of the instructions to Sir Charles the guide of his
" language in communicating with the Portuguse Govern-
" ment and with his diplomatic colleagues."

In the same dispatch which conveyed this instruction to
Sir William A'^Court, some observations were made to prevent

11

the possibility of Sir Charles Stuart acting " in the Regency
of Portugal," of which body " a foolish notion had got
abroad in France," that the Emperor, Don Pedro, had con-
stituted His Excellency a member.

Between the 12th of July and the 17th Mr. Canning ad-
dressed dispatches to the British representatives abroad,
urging the different Powers of the Continent to abstain from
any interference with the "free agency of Portugal," point-
ing out the inconsistency, if after having " put down the
" constitutional systems of Naples and Spain, not for their
" own intrinsic worthlessness, but simply and declaredly be-
" cause they were not octroy es by the Sovereign, the same
" Powers should combine against the constitutional charter
" of Portugal, which, whatever else might be its merits, was
" decidedly and unquestionably the emanation of the grace
" and free will of the lawful, and de facto ^ Sovereign of
" Portugal."

On the 17th* Mr. Canning sent copies of all these dispatches
to Sir William A'Court, remarking that His Excellency
could " not fail to observe with what anxious perseverance
" His Majesty's Government were labouring to create in other
" Powers a disposition favourable to the peace and securijty
" of Portugal."

At the end of this sentence there is a chasm in the papers
laid before Parliament, the consequence of which is, that the
following sentence, beginning, " In submitting these consider-
ations," is wholly unintelligible, the considerations sub-
mitted being left out.

* Vide Parliamentary Papers ^ No. VIT.

12*

The substance of that part of the dispatch not printed is
to this purport. The French Government had expressed
their determination to recommend the Portuguese Ministry
to convoke the Cortes, that that body might give its sanction
to the charter. As Mr. Canning thought that the wisdom
of such a course was very dubious, he felt, " although the
" British Government would not take upon itself the re-
" sponsibihty of recommending or dissuading the adoption
" of it, yet that it was their duty not to withhold from the
" Portuguese Government a statement of the reasons on
" which those doubts were founded.*" The substance of
these reasons has been already published in the dispatch to
Sir Charles Stuart of the 12th of July, with the exception of
the further difficulty which Mr. Canning thought should be
weighed, viz. : that the convocation of the ancient Cortes,
even if called together for the purpose of sanctioning the
adoption of the charter, '^ would be a departure from the
'' Emperor's commands, and pro tanto a defiance of his
'^ authority, whereby Portugal and her sovereign would be
" placed in opposition to each other, which would almost
" inevitably produce civil war.

"In submitting these considerations'' (which are omitted
in the published dispatch) " to the Count de Porto-Santo,
" your Excellency will take care," continued Mr. Canning,
" not to offer them as the settled opinion, or peremptory ad-
'^ vice of your Government, We are too conscious of the
" imperfectness of our acquaintance with the prevailing
" sentiments of the Portuguese nation, and of the inability
'^ of any foreign Government to enter fully into national
" feelings, prejudices, or prepossessions, to presume to offer

13

*^ counsel to the Portuguese Ministry, in any other sense, or
*' with any other view, than that of laying before them the
" elements of a decision which it is for them and them only
" to form.

" It appears to us, upon the whole, that the best chance
" of a safe and tranquil issue to the present extraordinary
" crisis in Portugal, will be to be found in an acceptance (as
'^ immediate as may be suitable with the importance of the
" measure) of the charter of Don Pedro, coupled (as it is)
*^ with his abdication of the throne. Any other course must,
" as it appears to us, be full of danger ; but if, nevertheless,
** another course should be pursued, we shall not be the less
" anxious for its peaceable and happy issue than if it were
" one on which we had ourselves advised."

The dispatch from which the above extract is made was
written on the 17th of July. On the 22nd of that month
Mr. Canning " sent off an extra packet " for the purpose of
transmitting a fresh dispatch to Sir Charles Stuart.

The reason of this extraordinary haste is not to be dis-
covered from the imperfect extracts* which the Government
have thought proper to lay before Parliament. And, as it is
left by the papers, it is quite impossible to comprehend why
an extra packet should be sent off on the 22nd for the express
purpose of repeating "His Majesty's pleasure'' that "Sir
Charles Stuart should return home forthwith," when an ex-
plicit order to the same effect was given but ten days before.
The explanation of this is as follows : — Mr. Canning, in his

* Vide 'Parliamentary Papers^ No. X.

14

first Instruction, on the ISth of July, desired Sir Charles
to return home " so soon as he should have delivered the
" decrees of the Emperor into the proper hands, and should
" have rendered an account to the Portuguese Ministry of
'' the mission with which he had been charged by His Most
" Faithful Majesty to his Son." This instruction was written
under the idea that the commercial arrangement which Sir
Charles had been authorized to negotiate between Portugal
and Brazil had been brought to a conclusion at Rio de Janeiro.
By a dispatch received from Sir Charles Stuart on the 21st,
dated Rio, Mr. Canning learnt that such was not the case, —
and fearing, from his experience of Sir Charles's conduct
during his mission to Brazil, that that diplomatist might
construe the words " have rendered to the Portuguese Minis-
try an account of the mission with which he was charged,"
&c., into a permission to remain at Lisbon, for the purpose of
" rendering that account for an indefinite period,'' Mr. Can-
ning, " to obviate any doubt which might possibly arise in
" His Excellency's mind, as to the execution of the instruc-
" tions contained in the dispatch of the 12th instant," sent
off " an extra packet" to desire Sir Charles to " return home
" forthwith, after delivering into the hands of the Regency
" the Decrees of the Emperor Don Pedro, and into the
" hands of M. de Porto-Santo, or, in case of M. de Porto-
" Santo's resignation, into those of his successor, or in default
" of a new appointment, into Sir William A'Court's hands,
" to be delivered by him to the proper minister, at a proper
" time, the papers relative to the commercial negociation
" between Portugal and Brazil, in whatever state that nego-
" tiation might be."

15

The dispatch condudes with a peremptory order to return
home.

Mr. Canning likewise took advantage of this occasion to
send a dispatch to Sir William A'Court, in order to counter-
act the effects of any active interference on the part of Sir
Charles Stuart, the motive for sending which is left by the
Parliamentary papers in the same obscurity as that which
dictated the dispatch to Sir Charles Stuart. That motive,
therefore, must be disclosed.

The exhortation which had been addressed by Mr. Can-
ning to the French and Austrian Governments to " abstain
from any interference with the free agency of Portugal," had
been received by those Governments in a very friendly man-
ner. France promised not to interfere, and Austria not to let
loose Don Miguel to oppose in Portugal the execution of his
brother's decrees. These intentions on the part of the two
Governments made Mr. Canning feel that it was more incum-
bent than ever upon him to take care that nothing should be
done in Portugal which should rouse the jealousy of the two
Powers, which he had just succeeded in allaying. He there-
fore wrote to Sir William A'Court to say that* " It was the
" anxious wish of His Majesty's Government that nothing
" might have been done by Sir Charles Stuart, whether
" under the commission of the Emperor Don Pedro, or at
" the solicitation of the Portuguese authorities, which could
" be liable, either in Portugal or throughout Europe, to be
" misconstrued as an authoritative interference in the inter-
" nal concerns of Portugal. Should any thing of that sort

* Vide Parliamentary Papers^ No. IX.

16

" unluckily have occurred. His Majesty's Government relies
" confidently on your Excellency (Sir William A'Court) for
" doing away the impression which it would be calculated to
" create."

While Mr. Canning was thus employed in London, it
appears that Sir Charles (who had reached Lisbon on the
7th of July, the very day on which his dispatch from Rio,
announcing his consent to be the bearer of the charter, ar-
rived in London), was not only executing the commands of
Don Pedro, in delivering the Decrees to the proper autho-
rities ; but, in the character of Portuguese Plenipotentiary,
was contributing very materially, by his exertions, to the
establishment of Don Pedro's constitution.

By the published dispatch from Sir Charles Stuart^, dated
July 15th, but not received till August 9th, we find that in
placing the Decrees of the Emperor in the hands of the In-
fanta, His Excellency told her Royal Highness that " he
" must wait until he learnt the sentiments of his Govern*
" ment before he could express an opinion upon that part
" of their contents which regulated the internal Gpvern-
" ment of Portugal."

But in this very same dispatch, in which he describes
himself as having made this prudent declaration, he takes
care to show that he acted entirely in defiance of it. " /
" recommended^'' he says, " Her Royal Highness to meet
" the charge (respecting the illegality of the different acts)
" by concerting a legal mode of putting them into execu-
'^ tion the moment that the Government should return to

* Vide Parliament anj Papers^ No, XII.

17

" the Capital, which we agreed should not be delayed
" beyond the following day.'' And by the unpublished
dispatch we learn, that Sir Charles " did his utmost to
" strengthen the resolution of the Princess, urging her to
^' take upon herself to act alone should her colleagues still
" hesitate.*" Sir Charles then it seems, by his own account,
did interfere in the establishment of the constitution; and
Sir William A' Court describes that interference '' as very
active, and direct."" It is true, that it was done without in-
structions, and that it went much beyond what Mr. Canning
would have wished, but he did not disavow Sir Charles,
preferring that the British Government should take upon
itself the responsibility of those acts (whatever that respon-
sibility might be) rather than incur the still greater respon-
sibility of producing a convulsion in Portugal, by expressing
any public disapprobation of them, which might have been
construed into a disapproval of the charter itself. Sir
William A'Court, on the other hand, scrupulously ab-
stained from any act whereby he could commit his Govern-
ment, contenting himself with stating, for the consideration
of the Portuguese ministers, Mr. Canning's opinions re-
specting the rejection of the charter, as well as his active
endeavours " to give a right direction to the policy of
Europe" on that occasion.

Such is the history of Mr. Canning's connection with the
Portuguese constitution, as drawn from all the records,
published and unpublished, which relate to it; and we
defy any individual, whether in office or not, to dispute
the truth of our statement, which, it will be seen, strictly
tallies with the account given of these transactions by Mr.

l»

Canning himself, in his speech* on sending troops to Por-
tugal.

The conclusion to be drawn from the whole of this state-
ment is this : — that although the British Government did
not suggest the grant of a constitutional charter to Por-
tugal, yet that from the circumstance of Sir Charles Stuart
having been the bearer of the grant, from its being
known that the opinions of the British ministry were in
favour of its acceptance, and, above all, from their having
taken upon themselves the responsibility of Sir Charles
Stuart's unauthorized activity, that it behoved the British
cabinet, in honour and good faith, to give to the Portu-
guese constitutionalists every moral support and coun-
tenance that was possible, consistently with the principles
of policy on which the Government had declared that it
would act. And further, that since it was impossible to
suppose that the advocates of that constitution in Portugal,
would nicely discriminate the exact quantum of encourage-
ment given by Great Britain to the establishment of the
constitution, and that many, from a confidence in British
protection had been induced to declare themselves in its
favour, who but for that confidence would have hesitated to
do so, it was incumbent on the British Government to
stretch a point in favour of the constitutional party, to
avoid being taxed with its betrayal.

Such is the conclusion to which all impartial persons must
arrive, in perusing the faithful history of these transactions ;
and such indeed is the conclusion to which the Author of

* Dec. 12, 182C.

19

the pamphlet mentioned in the beginning of these observa-
tions has arrived: but under the false idea, perhaps, of
making out a stronger case in favour of Portugal he has
perverted the evidence before him, and turned it against
Mr. Canning, in a way which is little creditable to his
candour.

The first point which we need notice, and which the
Author endeavours unfairly to make out, is, that there was
no real distinction between Sir Charles Stuart in his cha-
racter of Portuguese Plenipotentiary, and that of British
Ambassador.

This is attempted to be proved, first in page 7 ; and after-
wards the Author again returns to the charge in a triumphant
way in pages 17 and 18.

In page 7 he says, " This approbation^' (Mr. Canning^s
of Sir Charles Stuart's conduct) "is an explicit answer to
" the silly notion which has been attempted to be propa-
" gated of Sir Charles having acted, in making himself the
" bearer of the charter, as a Portuguese Plenipotentiary,
" and not as a British Ambassador. If this separation of
" characters had been possible, if it had been recognized at
" the time^ no approbation from the British Government
*' would have been wanted for an act performed by him as
" the functionary of another State. This after-invention
" was not then devised."

Here is a mass of real or feigned ignorance, and wilful
misrepresentation. The distinction between the two cha-
racters is asserted to be an " after-invention, not then"*"^ (that
is, when Mr. Canning gave his approbation) " devised."
This is false : as must at once appear to every one who reads

the papers with attention to dates. The distinction was
drawn in the very first instance by Don Pedro. " His
" Imperial Majesty stated his wish to send these Acts
" through my hands, as Portuguese Plenipotentiary^^'* said
Sir Charles Stuart to Mr. Canning in the first dispatch
announcing that he had consented to convey the charter to
Portugal.

The distinction is implied likewise in the terms of the
approbation. Mr. Canning said, that he " approved" of Sir
Charles " having agreed (under the peculiar circumstances
*' of his situation in Brazil) to be the bearer of the
" charter-f*,**' in other words, Mr. Canning consented to Sir
Charles Stuart being, as it were, the courier to convey and
to deliver it ; but at the same time he told him, thus far you
may go, but, to prevent your going further, return home
without delay.

But what made Sir Charles''s " situation in Brazil pecu-
liar," except it was his holding the character of Portuguese
Plenipotentiary, with the sanction of Great Britain, for a
particular purpose? Had he not held this character, it is
obvious that there would have been nothing "-' peculiar''''
in his situation.

Further, Sir Charles Stuart, in " delivering to Her Royal
" Highness, the Infanta, the several public Acts which had
" been entrusted to his care by her brother, the Emperor,
" told her that, as Portuguese Plenipotentiar-y^ he could
" not refuse to take charge of the papers J," &c. Sir

* Vide Parliamentary Papers, No. III.
t Vide Parliamentary Papers, No. V.
X Vide Parliamentarii Papers, No. XII.

21

Charles thus spoke to the Infanta many days before he
could have received any instructions from Mr. Canning, on
the subject of the constitution.

What a gross perversion then it is, even of the pub-
lished extracts from which the Author professes to form his
judgment, to say that this distinction was an " qfter-inven-
tion^ not devised'''* when Mr. Canning approved of Sir
Charles''s conduct !

Equally absurd is the Author's attempt, in page 18, to
prove that Sir Charles Stuart was not Portuguese Plenipo-
tentiary— ^for it is singular enough, that the only conclusion
to be drawn from his argument is directly the reverse of
that which he derives from it. He says, '* the device of a
" Portuguese Plenipotentiary was altogether a fiction, having
'' no real foundation.

" Sir Charles had indeed been invested with that cha-
" racter to the Emperor of Brazil, but by what process had
" he, upon his return to Lisbon, undergone a change into a
" Portuguese Plenipotentiary in Portugal itself.^ It has
" hitherto been understood, that an Ambassador having
" completed a special commission, and being returned to the
" Court from which it had been received, was thereby
" divested of the character with which he had been clothed,
" re-entering at once the walk of private life. At most, if it
" had so pleased the Regent of Portugal, it lay with Her
*' Royal Highness to continue to Sir Charles the character
" which he had borne of Her Plenipotentiary to the
" Emperor of Brazil, but this was not done."

Now the best way of exposing the fallacy of this reasoning
is, to explain the exact position in which Sir Charles was

m

placed. His Excellency, when be left England, was accre-
dited to the King of Portugal ; and he, likewise, was fur-
nished with full powers to act as the King of England'*s
Plenipotentiary, and Mediator for the adjustment of the
differences between the King of Portugal, and Brazil. When
" that negotiation had been brought to a happy conclusion,
" the British part of Sir Charles Stuart's mission termi-
" nated ; but Sir Charles, having been invested by the
" King of Portugal with the character of His Most Faithful
" Majesty's Plenipotentiary, remained at Rio in that situa-
'^ don, for the purpose of negotiating commercial arrange-
" ments between Portugal and Brazil.'' The death of His
Most Faithful Majesty at once put an end to that character
in Sir Charles Stuart, while it invested Don Pedro with
a new one — that of King of Portugal. Sir Charles could
not go on, as the representative of a person who had ceased
to exist. The demise, therefore, of his principal, reduced
Sir Charles to the rank of a private gentleman ; and from
that rank he was raised by Don Pedro, the new King of
Portugal, to that of Portuguese Plenipotentiary, as appears
by No. 4 of the published papers, by which Don Pedro,
as King of Portugal^ constitutes Sir Charles Stuart his
Plenipotentiary, to carry his decrees to his own kingdom.
The said full powers commencing, not " I, the Emperor,"
but ^' I, the King."

In the face, then, of this document, what perversity is it
in the Author to ask, " by what process Sir Charles had
become Portuguese Plenipotentiary .?" Could he be so igno-
rantly blind, as not to see that by this instrument the
acknowledged and lawful King of Portugal constituted Sir

Charles his Plenipotentiary to carry his commands to Portu-
gal ? This, indeed, was the only public character in which he
appeared at Lisbon. But the Author goes on to say, " that
" it lay with Her Royal Highness to continue to Sir Charles
" Stuart the character which he had home of Her Plenipo-
" tentiary to the Emperor of Brazil ; but this was not
" done;'

" Which he had borne r When? where? how invested?
from whom to be continued ? when " not done ?''' If he
ever bore the character of Her Royal Highness's Plenipo-
tentiary, he must have had it conferred upon him by her
after the death of her father ; but this, it is said, was " not
done."" How, therefore, could " it lay with Her Royal
" Hightiess to continue to Sir Charles a character with
" which he had never been invested ?" All this reasoning,
therefore, is sheer nonsense and idle talk, and is only on
B. par with the Author's insidious assertion, that '' the
" character of Ambassador from the Emperor of Brazil
" had not been conferred upon Sir Charles." A proposition
which is, indeed, quite true, but is evidently so stated for
the purpose of misleading.

Sir Charles was not made Ambassador from Don Pedro,
Emperor of Brazil^ but he was made Plenipotentiary from
Don Pedro, King of Portugal ; so that the Author seeks
to have it both ways, first saying, that Sir Charles was not
Portuguese Plenipotentiary; and, then, that he was not
Ambassador from the Emperor of Brazil. But, in the name
of common sense, with what character was he invested by
the full power given to him by Don Pedro, if he were
neither Brazilian Ambassador nor Portuguese Plenipoten-

24

tiary ? Really, there never was such a juggle of argumen^t
attempted to be palmed upon the public as close reasoning.

Here, then, this " shallow attempt" at misrepresentation
may " be dismissed."

The remaining misrepresentations of this pamphlet are
not so concentrated as the one which has just been exposed.
But the drift of the argument, which is contained in the
pages between 8 and 15, may be succinctly stated as follows :
The British Government made itself parties to the charter,
because they approved of Sir Charles Stuart conveying it,
and because they " recommended its adoption ;" and that
having thus committed themselves, they began, after a time,
to " evince an uncalled-for anxiety to shield themselves
from reproach."

Now the truth of the first part of this argument we are
quite ready to admit. But that Mr. Canning, by any act
of his, commenced the " system of shifting and tergiver-
sation," we utterly deny ; for it would be difficult to invent
a system of foreign policy (if system it can be called) more
directly opposed to Mr. Canning**s than the one pursued by
the present Government.

There can be no doubt, that the exhortations to foreign
Powers to abstain from interference, coupled with the undis-
guised desire of Great Britain, that the Portuguese should
of their own free will adopt the charter, did morally con-
tribute to secure its adoption. And Mr. Canning was, cer-
tainly, always ready, to the very last moment of his existence,
to give to the constitution the same moral countenance
for its support, which he had not hesitated to give to its
establishment.

25

The Author pretends to discover a disposition on the
part of Mr. Canning " to shield himself from reproach ;"'
because, after he had countenanced the charter by his
dispatches of the 12th and 17th of July, he took advantage
of an " extra packet, which was sent off to Sir Charles
Stuart,^' to express to Sir William A'Court " his anxious
" wish that nothing should have been done at Lisbon which
" could be liable to be construed into an authoritative in-
" terference with the internal concerns of Portugal/' This
term, " authoritative interference,^' says the pamphlet,
" is evidently intended to afford a loop-hole for escape
" from the responsibility attached to the part we had
" been playing."" But from the very' beginning Mr.
Canning disclaimed " authoritative interference ^ that is,
interference by advice given with an intimation or threat
that its rejection would be resented — and so scrupulously
careful is he to mark the distinction, that when he does
direct his opinions to be declared in favour of a particular
course, he says, that, " if another course should be pursued,
" we should not be the less anxious for its peaceable and
" happy issue than if it were one which we had ourselves
" advised." What loop-hole for escape, then, the term
'' authoritative interference'''* affords, which the terms used
in the first dispatches do not equally afford, can only be dis-
cerned by a perverted imagination. And yet, upon the use
of this " term," the Author charges Mr. Canning with having
" invented'' it, to enable him to shrink from responsibility. -

Before dismissing the first division of this pamphlet, we
will just call the attention of the reader to ■_ the singular
inconsistency of its Author. He charges Mr. Canning with

26

endeavouring to ^^retracf" the encouragement which he had
given to the Portuguese constitutionalists, and then in a
subsequent part of the pamphlet he makes a quotation from
Mr. Canning's speech in Parhament, delivered five months
afterwards, on the sending troops to Portugal, as a proof of
his persevering and unceasing encouragements. Here end
our remarks on that portion of the pamphlet, which relates
to Mr. Canning'^s conduct in regard to the Portuguese con-
stitutional charter, and upon which it has been endeavoured
so unwarrantably to throw the charges of retractation and
vacillation.

What could have been the object of the Writer in thus
attempting to vilify and degrade the conduct of the man,
whose principles and system of policy he so eloquently
applauds, and so ably contrasts with the course now pursued,
it would be difficult to determine ; as we cannot give him
credit for having been in ignorance of the falseness of the
colouring which he has given to these transactions.

To the second part of the pamphlet we should give our
cordial concurrence and unqualified approbation, were it not
for the following paragraph, of which it is not easy to under-
stand the precise meaning or tendency.

*' Each successive Secretary of State," says the Author,
" has made it his first object to overturn the measures of his
" predecessor, and thus there has been imprinted upon our
" counsels a character of vacillation, as fatal to our honour
'^ as to our interests. For this misfortune, resulting from
" the violence of our party-spirit, no remedy can be found,
" unless in the greater Jia^itT/ of opinions in the Parliament."

We freely admit, that a change of measures in our

27

foreign relations was marked and decisive, when, on the death
of Lord Londonderry, the management of them devolved on
Mr. Canning ; while we indignantly deny that the change
resulted from the unworthy motives ascribed. We also readily
admit the fact, that the present Government have abandoned
Mr. Canning's system of policy, and, with the same attach-
ment to arbitrary principles which Lord Londonderry
entertained, have re-adopted his system of policy. But we
are botmd in candour to avow our belief, that the change has
not resulted so much from party-spirit as from their real
sentiments and opinions, being in direct opposition to those
which guided the policy of Mr. Canning; and we are the
more confirmed in this belief, from the knowledge we have
of the thwarting and opposition which Mr. Canning expe-
rienced in the development of his system of foreign policy,
from the most influential minister of the present day, when
that minister was his colleague in the Government.

This persuasion, however, only tends to confirm the
opinion, that to such acknowledged and inherent accordance
of feeling and policy, in opposition to the system of their
predecessor, the remedy proposed must prove totally inade-
quate ; or, if it has any effect at all, can only increase that
inconsistency and vacillation which it is the object to cure.

But unless the Author is really more ignorant of diplo-
macy than we believe him to be, we would ask him, if he
is not aware that there is a moral support given to any
measure of foreign policy, by the known and acknowledged
" fixity^ of sentiment of the director of that policy in unison
with the spirit of the measure proposed, and which has more

28

influence in making it adequate to its purpose than a more
authoritative enforcement of the same measure could have,
if supposed to have been adopted by the Government pro-
posing it against their own wishes and opinions.

Does he not beheve that the sentence he quotes from
Mr, Canning's speech in ParHament, " May God prosper
" this attempt at the estabhshment of constitutional liberty
" in Portugal !'''' had as much influence in preventing any
attempt at its subversion from foreign Powers and domestic
intrigue as a more direct interference could have had ; and,
supposing such a declaration had been wrung by the " fixity "
of opinion in Parhament, from the disciple of Metternich,
under the guidance of the Duke of WeUington, does he
believe it would have had any such effect on foreign Powers,
or would have afforded any moral aid against anti-constitu-
tional cabal and rebellion in Portugal.

And further, whether it may not be asserted, that Lord
Aberdeen's declaration in Parliament, " He was much
'' mistaken, if those persons who supported Don Miguel
'' were not the friends of this country,'' gave stability to
Don Miguel's usurpation, while it sounded like the knell of
departed hope to those whom we had formerly protected, and
foretold the atrocities of Terceira, which has left to all those
who remained true to their king and constitution, nothing
but despair, submission, dungeons, and the rack.

Away then with the cant, that measures not men ought
to be the object of solicitude to a British Parliament ; in
foreign policy, we might almost say the reverse of that
maxim would be nearer the truth.

29

But had the remedy proposed been confined to the coun-
teracting erroneous measures in domestic policy, the proposi-
tion might have appeared more plausible ; indeed its efficacy
has been proved by the miraculous and sudden conversion of
many of the existing Government on that great measure of
domestic policy which had so long divided and perplexed the
counsels of kings and ministers — the only measure, too,
upon which the present leading ministers stood solemnly
pledged to their king and country, to resist with all their
might — that, such was their horror of being considered in
the remotest degree accessary to its ultimate success, they
would not consent to remain members of a Government at
the head of which it had pleased His Majesty to place an
individual whose opinions were favourable to that question.
Undoubtedly this great and salutary measure was trium-
phantly carried by their obedience to the voice of public
opinion, when that opinion was so decidedly pronoujiced that
^' fixity " of principle against it became incompatible with
" fixity " of power.

But while we give the present ministers full credit for
having been the means, the only immediate means, of con-
ferring this boon on their country, we were never among
the number who, in the enthusiasm of their gratitude for
this benefit, were ready to place all their confidence in those
who had conferred it, without examining how far it had been
accompanied by want of principle, of good faith, and of
treachery to others.

We were, and still are, of opinion that great as the good
was that has been gained, its having been acquired by

30

such means was not only discreditable in the highest degree
to those whose inconsistency of principle had procured it,
but that it did, temporarily at least, set at nought all idea
of principle and good faith among public men, who

" Were to no principle true,
Not fixed to old friends or to new,"

That it was a beacon lighted in the face of the world to
warn foreign nations, and all those in this country who
valued their own consistency and character, not to trust to
the present rulers of the policy of Great Britain, or to iden-
tify their opinions with the professed principles of the
Government, lest, on some occasion of unlooked-for expe-
diency, what had been proclaimed as their settled opinion
one day, might be totally forgotten or wilfully abandoned
the next.

We h^ve now dohe with the pamphlet; but before we
conclude, we will submit a few general observations to the
reader, on the policy pursued by the present Government
towards Portugal.

At the time when Sir Charles Stuart brought over the
constitution from Brazil the Duke of Wellington was a
member of the Administration ; whatever, therefore, the
policy and conduct of the British Government may have
been on that occasion. His Grace was as much committed to
it as any other member of the cabinet. If, therefore, he
has turned suddenly round, and acted in defiance of that
policy, he has disappointed hopes which he had been party
to exciting.

31

It has been already shown, that, owing to circumstances
over which Mr. Canning had no control, it became a duty
incumbent upon the British Government to deal generously
with the constitutional party in Portugal, by giving them
the aid of its moral countenance. This obligation Mr.
Canning would have fearlessly discharged, after having once
contracted it, because it was an invariable principle of his
policy to act with good faith, whatever might be the con-
sequence ; but it must not be supposed that he consented
inadvertently to these acts which imposed those obligations
upon him. Such was not the case : his policy towards Por-
tugal had invariably been to maintain an influence with her
Government, and to cement a close union between the two
countries, because he considered it advantageous to both.
When, therefore, he encouraged the establishment of the
constitution, he did so as well because he felt convinced
that its rejection would entail the greatest evil upon Por-
tugal, as because he knew that the party which was friendly
to free institutions were, for the most part, likewise friendly
to connection with England ; while the party which was
attached to absolute monarchy were hostile to that connec-
tion. The treaties which bind us to Portugal are of so
onerous a nature, that it is of the utmost consequence to this
country that we should have established there an amicable
Government; Mr. Canning, therefore, advisedly gave the
moral support of this country to that party which was fa-
vourably disposed towards Great Britain.

The same policy then which induced Mr. Canning ori-
ginally to give this moral support to the constitutionalists,
ought alone to have been sufficient to have induced his sue-

32

\
cessors to continue it. But this support, which it might in

the first instance have been a mere matter of expediency to
grant, it became a breach of faith to discontinue, after indi-
viduals had been by it betrayed into committing themselves
to the constitution by overt acts of theirs in its support.
If, then, the withdrawal of .this, moral countenance would
have been a breach of faith, in what terms ought we to
describe not only its withdrawal from the constitutionalists
but its undisguised transfer to their adversaries ?

If it were so transferred (and we are prepared to show
by a chain of evidence that it was), we appeal to those
feelings of honour which we trust still warm the hearts of
a majority of the people of this country, whether the
niinisters who have so acted have not given cause to all
nations to mistrust us for the future ?

But " we have not betrayed them,'' cry the Duke of Wel-
lington and Lord Aberdeen : "we have not betrayed
them,'' re-echoes the consistent leader of the House of
Commons.

To this we answer, " facts are stubborn things," and
tliose which the Government admits are amply sufficient to
show that the destruction of the Constitution is owing to the
encouragement given by the Government to the party by
whom it was overthrown.

, The question, which had been much agitated, respecting
Don Miguel's right to the Regency under that charter, was
set at rest by the Decree of Don Pedro, dated July 30,
1827, constituting the Infant his Lieutenant for governing
the Kingdom of Portugal : Don Pedro, however, accom-
panied this decree with letters to the Emperor of Austria

S3

and our King, requesting that their majesties would watch
over the preservation of the constitutional charter, the ac*
ceptance of which was an essential condition of his abdica-
tion. It is to be presumed that it was in consequence of
this request that Sir Henry Wellesley, our Ambassador at
Vienna, was authorized by Lord Dudley (in the spirit of
Mf* Canning's policy) to take part in the conferences which
were held in that capital respecting His Royal Highnesses
return to assume the government of the kingdom.

In the course of these conferences at Vienna, the Infant
bound himself by the most solemn promises to maintain the
charter; and the British Ambassador^ by taking part in
those conferences, and affixing his signature to the protocol^
pledged his country, if not to enforce their fulfilment, at any
fate not to help their violation. Further, as if still more
openly to connect this country with the affairs of Portugal^
the Infant was, as it were, compelled to pass through England
on his way to Lisbon. All this occurred under the adminis^
tration of Lord Goderich. But before the Infant had
quitted the shores of this country, the Duke of Wellington
became prime minister. Some of the members of Mr.
Canning'^s Government, still, however, retained their offices,
and his course of policy towards Portugal was not by any
means wholly abandoned, althou'gh it must be admitted
that there was no great wisdom displayed in the omission of
all precautionary measures to induce the Infant to adhere to
his engagements* If, for instance, the Infant had been told
that England expected him to fulfil them ; and if orders had
been sent to the commanders of the British troops to with-
draw them from Lisbon on the very first indications of a

34

design on the part of Don Miguel to play false, it is more
than probable that he would never have been able to have
effected his usurpation — for his attempts would have been
put down in the first instance by the constitutionalists, had it
not been for the protection which the British troops afforded
to his person. These, however, were faults of omission
occasioned through want of foresight, and not through
design ; for Sir Frederick Lamb'^s conduct was approved
when he sent back the loan for Don Miguel which Great
Britain had guaranteed, and orders were sent by Lord
Dudley to Sir Frederick Lamb to depart in the event of
Don Miguel's assuming the title of king ; facts which show
that there was a party in the Government which had no
disposition to aid in the destruction of the constitution.
In the month of May, all those individuals who, having
belonged to the administration of Lord Goderich, had re-
mained with the Duke of Wellington, quitted the Govern-
ment, and the Earl of Aberdeen was appointed the suc-
cessor of Lord Dudley. From this period the anti-
liberals were wholly free from restraint; and accordingly
we find, before the year expired, not only that our whole
moral support (which would have been more than sufficient
to have turned the scale) was given to Don Miguel, but
that we actually forcibly interfered against the lawful Queen
of Portugal in behalf of the usurper of her throne ! !

The first proof of the moral support being given to Don
Miguel is to be found in Lord Beresford's correspondence
with certain influential persons who surrounded the Queen
mother. His lordship's connection with Portugal had
given him considerable influence in that country. He had

S5

been invited by the Infanta Regent to assume the command
of the army shortly after the constitution was estabhshed,
and he went to Lisbon accordingly ; but he was so hostile,
to the new order of things, that he placed difficulties in the
way of his acceptance of the offers which were made to him ;
and the declarations bf his intimate friends, made, as they
asserted, by his authority, that England would not send any
troops when the invasion from Spain took place, did very
considerable injury to the constitutional cause.

He at last left Lisbon discontented, and little more
than a year afterwards was appointed to the high post
of Master-General of the Ordnance, by the Duke of
Wellington. His lordship carried on a correspondence
with Lisbon, which it is confidently asserted went to urge
Don Miguel to persevere in his treacherous course; Lord
Beresford, indeed^ denies this assertion. But can he deny
that he distinctly expressed his opinion that Don Miguel
had a right to the throne; and was not such an opinion
encouragement ? Can the Government deny that Sir
Frederick Lamb complained in his public dispatches of
the injury which the constitutional cause sustained by the
tendency of his lordship's letters ? If this were so, was it
not the bounden duty of the head of the Government to
dismiss Lord Beresford from his situation, in order that his
correspondence might be deprived of that authority which is
unavoidably attached to that of a man holding so high a
post in the Government ? Was is not the bounden duty of
the head of the Government to have required Lord Beres-
ford to show all the letters which he had written to Lisbon
upon political subjects ? But the Premier carefully abstains

36

from saying that he had seen these letters, confining himself
to the assertion, that he had seen those which Lord Beresford
had received ; as if the mischief which had been done at Lisbon
was occasioned by the letters received by Lord Beresford in
London, instead of by the letters sent by Lord Beresford to
Lisbon. The only explanation of this lenity towards his
lordship is to be found in the fact, that his letters were in
accordance with the secret wishes of the Government. The
next proof is to be found in the appointment of Sir Henry
Chamberlain (who had been British Consul at Rio de
Janeiro, and who was well known to have refused to accept
any consular employment) to be British Consul at Lisbon,
a selection almost amounting to the renewal of diplomatic
relations. Lastly, by way of putting the finish to this
series of moral support, Lord Aberdeen declared, last year,
in his place in Parliament, that the Miguelites were the
friends of England. But the Government, not content with
this unauthoritative encouragement, although professing neu-
trality, violated that neutrality in favour of Don Miguel.

A body of Portuguese troops had fled for refuge to
Spain, after an ineffectual attempt to support the constitution
at Oporto ; and having been driven from Spain, sought, and
were allowed to find, an asylum at Plymouth. After some
time the Government, finding that their presence there kept
Don Miguel in alarm, told the Marquis of Palmella that
they must be dispersed in the interior, and separated from
their officers, or else they must quit the country.

This order was certainly deaUng out hard measure to
these unfortunate refugees. Neutrahty would have been as
strictly preserved, by a notification that they would not be

37

allowed to sail in hostile array from this country, without
reducing them to the equally disastrous alternatives of
either being dispersed in the interior, or transported to the
other side of the Atlantic.

The Duke of Wellington defends* this proceeding from
the bitter complaints made against it by the Marquis of
Palmella, by reference to the " discussion and transactions
^^ with Spain, respecting a similar body of Portuguese troops,
^^ not prisoners ;'' and taunts the Marquis of Palmella in no
very generous way, even if the two cases had been " similar,^
with " two years having effaced them from his recollection."
But these two cases were not '^ similar."

Without entering into the distinctions between deserters
and refugees, there was one difference between them which
it is indeed extraordinary that the duke should have for-
gotten, at the very moment when he reproaches the Mar-
quis of Palmella for his want of memory.

It is quite true, as the Duke said, that the British Govern-
ment *^ insisted that the King of Spain should not only sepa-
** rate officers from soldiers, placing a certain number of the
" latter only in the same town, but that the whole should be
" removed far into the interior of the country ;" — but on
what grounds did the British Government insist on this being
done ? not on the general principles of the law of nations,
but on the specific ground of the fulfilment of treaties.
Spain was bound, by treaty to Portugal, to deliver up all
deserters ; and the refusal, on the part of Spain, to fulfil the
obligations of treaty, would have justified the Portuguese

* Vide Parliamentary Papers^ p. 101,

38

Government in issuing a declaration of war. At our insti-
gation that Government consented to moderate their de-
mands, and to require only the dispersion of the desertei^
in the interior, and the surrender of their arms and accou-
trements.

The British Government therefore rested its demand on
the stipulations of treaty. And since there are no treaties
between this country and Portugal, which bind us to deliver
up Portuguese deserters, much less refugees, the two cases
are not " similar."

The next assertion of His Grace is equally erroneous : he
says, that " a detachment of His Majesty's troops was sent to
" Portugal because the King of Spain had not performed
" the duties of neutrality, as was required from His Catholic
" Majesty, and had suffered the Portuguese troops in
" Spain to commit the very act which he had repeatedly
^^ assured Count Palmella that the King of England would
'* not permit those in England to commit."" Now it is
really astonishing, that two years should have effaced from
His Grace's recollection these transactions with Portugal.

The troops were not sent to Portugal because Spain
suffered the Portuguese deserters to attack Portugal,
they were sent on the express plea of those deserters
being Spanish mercenaries, because they had '' been
armed, clothed, and regimented by Spain.'' If, therefore,
England had allowed a hostile expedition to set sail from
Plymouth which had woif been " armed, clothed, and regi-
mented by her Government," it would not have been the
" very act " to oppose which England had two years before
sent troops to Portugal.

39

The two cases therefore are not " similar," and the asser-
tion that they were so betrays the weakness of his cause.

But this unfriendly treatment of these unfortunate re-
fugees did not end here.

Shortly after the decision had been taken by the Marquis
of Palmella and his friends, that the troops should quit this
country, accounts arrived from Terceira that that island had
preserved its fidelity to the young queen.

Upon this the Marquis of Palmella acquainted the duke
with the intention of the Portuguese troops to proceed to
Terceira instead of to Brazil. His Grace, however, an-
swered that the British Government, having determined to
be neutral, would not permit the troops to go to Terceira,
although they were unarmed. And the reason which he
gives for this resolution is, that he knows arms have been
sent from this country to Terceira.

It appears, from His Grace's statement, that the Brazilian
minister applied to Lord Aberdeen for permission to
embark 1180 stand of arms, and 150 barrels of gun-
powder, on board a Brazilian frigate ; and that Lord Aber-
deen, in consenting to their embarkation, " expressed his
^' confidence that the Brazilian minister would give his
" assurance that these arms and stores were not intended to
" be employed in the civil dissentions in Portugal and its
^' dependencies."*'

Now here is as strong a proof as well could be required,
of the bias of the Government in favour of the Usurper.

Neutrality would have been as completely observed by
permitting export to both belligerents, as by prohibiting it
to both. Prohibition was peculiarly hurtful to the consti*

tutionalists, and prohibition was the mode adopted for the
enforcement of neutrality.

In answer to Lord Aberdeen, the Brazilian minister gave
a somewhat equivocal reply, and the arms were conveyed to
Terceira.

Without justifying the language of the Brazilian minister,
we yet maintain that it is no justification of the refusal of the
English minister to permit the landing of the Portuguese
refugees at Terceira. Even supposing that the arms had been
shipped by the Marquis of Palmella, and sent to Terceira,
that refusal would not have been justified : on this point we
have Mr. Canning's authority.

In discussing the possibility of the Government pre-
venting Lord Coehrane's expedition to Greece against the
Turks, he makes use of words which in every respect
apply to this affair.

^' Yachts,*" he says, " may sail from this country, and*so
" may steam-boats, if unarmed, without any question ; and
" so may arms, as matter of merchandise; and, however
" strong the moral credence of their destination, the law
^' cannot interfere to stop them. It is only when these ele^
" ments of armament are combined that they come within
" the purview of the law ; and if that combination does not
^' take place till they have left this country, the law is power-
" less against them."" In Mr. Canning's opinion, therefore,
the fact of the arms having preceded these refugees did not
give the Government any authority over the expedition after
its departure. If, however, its being partly composed of
troops gave it the character of a hostile armament, why did
not the ministers interfere with it where alone they had juris*

41

diction ; viz. in the port of its equipment, " The Atlantic
is not the dominion of the King of England,'^ the Duke of
Wellington correctly observed : and Lord Aberdeen, in his
speech on the 18th of February last, asserts, that " we had no
*' right to protect the Portuguese Refugees from Portugal,
** concept in England,'''* If, then, we had no right to protect
them against Portugal except in England^ what' right had
we to aid Portugal against them oiit of England ? We had
none ; and, by Lord Aberdeen''s own showing, so soon as
the transports reached a place out of the king's dominions
they were out of his jurisdiction, and the Government, having
permitted their departure, had no control over their des-
tination.

Why, then, did the Government prefer the illegal course
of assailing them at Terceira, to the legal method of seizing
the transports in harbour ? Why, according to the Duke of
Wellington's own account, because the latter mode would
have " excited more noise, objection, and opposition, than
had been occasioned by the measures which he adopted."

But how would it have excited this "noise, objection,
and opposition,'' which His Grace appears so much to have
dreaded ? Simply, because the question, whether the expe-
dition was an armament or not, must have been submitted
to a jury; and since an expedition without arms is desti-
tute of the one thing essential to constitute it an armament^
His Grace would without doubt have been defeated in the
prosecution. To such a tribunal therefore it appears that
the Government feared to appeal. The military habit of
our ruler could not brook the thought of having his wishes
restrained by civil process; and he knew, that while he

42

could peremptorily command a British officer to fire upon
a body of unarmed men, he could not dictate a verdict to an
English jury.

The duke indeed seems to have no desire to conceal
that he did all in his power to support Don Miguel. For
at the very moment that he declines discussing the chief
point in dispute, viz. : whether the firing on the Portuguese
refugees in the waters belonging to their own sovereign
was or was not a breach of the law of nations, all that he
attempts to make out is, that, " according to the best
opinions he could obtain,**' it was not a violation of that law.
Now, if the duke''s bias was not in favour of Don Miguel,
it behoved him distinctly to show, not merely that the law of
nations justified his act, but that the laws of neutrality
peremptorily prescribed this harsh and rigorous treatment
of unfortunate men, whom we had inhospitably driven from
our shores.

But, in order that there may be no doubt as to the dislike
of the Government towards the constitutionalists. His Grace
does not hesitate to read a very severe lecture of condem-
nation and reproof to the other Powers of Europe, because
they had put a different interpretation upon the principles of
international law, and had not prevented these unhappy
exiles from landing on the only spot in the world which
still acknowledged the authority of their lawful sovereign.

How the high-spirited nation, to whom this rebuke is
addressed, will bear to be so tutored, yet remains to be seen.
But we will venture to say, that such language was never
before addressed by a prime minister of England to friendly
Powers.

43

The subject of Terceira has been so much discussed both
in and out of Parhament that we will not detain our readers
by any further arguments respecting it. We are content to
rest our case on the declaration of the ministers themselves,
and on Mr. Canning^s recorded opinion.

The whole indeed of our late behaviour towards unhappy
Portugal has been shown to have been at variance with that
which Mr. Canning adopted. And it is unjust of the minis-
ters to endeavour to make that statesman responsible for the
disastrous consequences resulting from their own misma-
nagement, by pretending that they are only following his
example, in seeking to "disconnect themselves*'' and the
country from "every thing belonging to the Portuguese
constitution." The history which we have already given
demonstrates that this is misrepresentation. Mr. Canning
had no such wish ; his single object being confined to show-
ing, that he was neither the suggestor of the constitution at
Rio, or the imposer of it at Lisbon.

But, supposing it were true, that Mr. Canning had mani-
fested an " extraordinary anxiety '' to disconnect himself from
the charter, that would not justify the " extraordinary
anxiety'' of the Government to connect itself with Don
Miguel, whereby we are now involved in difficulties from
which extrication can only be purchased by dishonour.
Already, in the Speech from the Throne, the Government
complains of the numerous embarrassments arising from the
continued " interruption of our diplomatic relations" with

* Vide Lord Aberdeen's Speech^ Feb. 19, 1830.

*4

Portugal ; which embarrassments, it is said, " increase His
" Majesty's desire to effect the termination of so serious an
« evil."

But what is the mode by which it is intended to cure this
evil, of their own creation ? Why, by recognising as King
of Portugal, a man whom the ministry admit to be an
usurper ; — whom in defending they are content to brand as
"heartless and incorrigible;" — and whose "cruelty" they
take for granted, because they know him to be a " coward ! "

We are far from maintaining that the time may not come,
when, upon certain conditions, it may be necessary for Great
Britain to acknowledge the de facto Government of Por-
tugal ; but we do maintain, that since the existence of that
de facto Government owes its origin to tlie favour of Great
Britain, it cannot be recognised without sullying our fame,
and degrading our character. Whenever, however, we do re-
cognise Don Miguel, let us not be deceived into supposing,
that we shall thereby regain our influence in Portugal. That
prince still hates England, notwithstanding the partiality
which her Government has shown towards him. He hates
her, because he well knows that her free press will never
cease to hold up his " heartless cruelty" and " incorrigible
cowardice " to the scorn and abhorrence of mankind. While
Miguel reigns as absolute king, British influence will never
revive in Portugal ; influence which, during a series of long
and difficult transactions, spread over a period of upwards of
four years, Mr. Canning had laboured so successfully to
preserve, the present Government have lost in not quite as
many months ! The Tagus is no longer a friendly harbour

45

for a British squadron, and our transactions with Portugal
are reduced to tame remonstrances for injuries, which, in no
one instance, have been effectually redressed.

Were these, however, the only effects resulting from our
policy towards our " oldest ally," we might, perhaps, sub-
mit in patience to endure them. But the evil, though com-
mencing with Portugal, does not end there, and affects,
most materially, our position towards the other Powers of
the continent.

The world judged of Mr. Canning's sentiments by his
political measures, and particularly by his treatment of
Portugal. It was seen that his actions accorded with hiiS
professions, and England was beloved, because the genuine
feelings of her leading minister were truly believed to be
favourable to the just and regulated liberties of the people.

In like manner the sentiments of the present Government
have been estimated by their conduct towards Portugal, the
affairs of which country were those which first arrested the
attention of the Duke of Wellington after the formation of
this Government. We have already shown how those affairs
were treated : that, notwithstanding the sacred rights of legi-
timate succession were arrayed on the side of the constitu-
tion, and on the other side there was only a " heartless,"
" incorrigible, " and '^ cruel " usurper, with nothing to re-
commend him but a desire to act the tyrant, as absolute
king, yet, on this polluted cause was bestowed the counte-
nance and encouragement of Great Britain. The universal:
cry of foreign nations then was, that the British Govern-
ment was hostile to freedom, and a new Holy Alliance was
expected to grow up under its fostering protection. The con-

46

cessions to the Catholics (the test of liberalism in domestic
policy) were not considered as any proof of liberality, but
were looked upon rather as an expedient to retain power
than as evidence of a real change of sentiment ; while the
opposition to Greek freedom, and the setting up of the
Polignac administration in France, for which, whether
justly or unjustly, our Government enjoys either the credit
or the odium, are considered but additional proofs of its
strong apostolical predilection.

This change in the character of our foreign policy has
produced a corresponding change in the feelings of the con-
tinental nations, — an ill-omened alteration, which few people
perceive, and of which fewer still understand the importance.
It was Mr. Canning's policy to obtain for Great Britain the
confidence and good-will of the people of other nations,
not, however, by flattering their prejudices, or encouraging
their discontent, but by showing a fixed determination to
act with impartial justice towards them. While he was at
the helm, there was not one of the European governments
which dared to provoke the vengeance of England, because
they well knew that war with England would be a measure
too unpopular to hazard. Thus, Mr. Canning was enabled
to hold language, and to carry measures in defiance of the
principles and prejudices of some, and contrary to the wishes
of the governments of all the great Continental Powers. By
this means he obtained over these governments an influence
which he employed not only to promote the interests of
England, but the general prosperity of the world.

Alas ! how different is our present position ! Go to the
North, and hear the terms of bitterness and contempt with

4f

^liich England is assailed by the Russian Government, {on
our vacillation — by the Russian people, for our illiberality.
Go to Germany, and you may listen in vain for the praises
which the name of England used to call forth when Can*
ning ruled her destinies. Turkey complains of being be-
trayed. Greece considers us her enemy. Cross the Channel,
and you will find in France the feelings of ancient rivalry,
which Mr. Canning'*s policy had well nigh extinguished, re-
vived with almost incredible virulence. Sail to Portugal,
and there you will see that we are hated by all parties, and
trusted by none. While the thousands exiled from their
homes, in consequence of our change of policy, imprecate
curses on British perfidy, and serve as a warning to all, not
to place reliance on British protection.

This universal consent of the people of the Continent to
load this country with opprobrium, is a danger of no com-
mon magnitude.

" There is no readier source of war than national ill-will,"
wisely observes the Author of the pamphlet on which we
have been commenting. Are not the great majority of the
inhabitants of Europe friendly to hberal institutions ? If so,
can it be doubted that those who compose that majority
must feel ill-will towards a country, whose ministers do not
even attempt to disguise their leaning towards arbitrary
power, since they openly avow, in the British Senate, their
regret at the success at Terceira of the brave constitution-
ahsts who feared not to confront all dangers, and to withstand
usurpation and tyranny, in defence of a free constitution and
a lawful sovereign. To justify this expression of regret, so
uncongenial to British feelings^ it is hinted, that the resis-r

48

tance at Terceira, to Don Miguel, may endanger the
peace of Europe ; but let not the country be deceived*
If the peace of Europe is i)roken, it will be because Great
Britain has abdicated the ^' Umpire'^s '^ throne, and has con-
verted herself into an ^' adversary "^ of constitutional freedom.
It was because " the professors of violent doctrines on both
sides'' dreaded England's taking part against them that
their mutual excesses were restrained. But now that
Great Britain is ranged on the side of absolutism, the friends
of liberal institutions^ feeling that they know the worst, are
preparing for action.

The conflict of principles, which Mr. Canning predicted^
is on the eve of its commencement ; the establishment of an
apostolical Government in France has roused the passions
of that people ; they look not to measures, but to men ; they
argue, that even if liberal laws shall be proposed by the
ministers, it will be only to enable them to consolidate their
power, till the opportunity shall offer for effecting a counter-
revolution. Distrusting the dispositions of their rulers, they
feel that they have no safety but in victory. And if they
become victorious, who can venture to predict, with their
present feelings towards the Government of this country^
how long it may be before we are driven into a war, by
insults^ or injuries, too offensive to be tolerated. And if we
are so driven, where are we to look for allies ? The
British ministers have been too ready to abandon their pro-
fessed principles, and have shown themselves too vacillating
in their diplomatic transactions, to allow the absolute monar^
chies of the continent to place any reliance upon their con-
sistency ; and it is to be feared that Great Britain, instead of

49

being able to act the part of umpire, will serv6 but as the
object of a common attack.

Let it not be supposed, that this commercial country can
shut itself up within itself, and survey in tranquil security
the struggles and commotions of its neighbours.

We have played too distinguished a part in latter times to
be able to find a '* refuge in littleness." If we do nothing to
maintain our high character we shall speedily lose it, as well
as what is far worse — the power of regaining it.

Let us not be deluded with the idea that our maritime
preponderance does not excite the envy of other states. It
is witnessed with the utmost jealousy, — and if we once let
the world see that we prefer a base submission to vengeance
of our own insults, while we evince a heartless disregard of the
oppression and the wrongs inflicted on our adherents, we
shall be valueless as an ally ; and every petty state will follow
the example of Don Miguel, in treating British subjects
with injustice, and the remonstrances of their Government
with contempt.

We dannot then withdraw from continental politics-— the
attempt, if long persevered in, would infallibly end in the
ruin of our vital interests and the destruction of our com-
merce.

No one felt more entirely convinced of this than Mr. Can-
ning ; and therefore the leading object of his foreign policy
was, to preserve the peace of the world, holding high the
balance, and grasping, but not unsheathing the sword. It
was for this end that he sought to place this country in the
position of an umpire; in order that, by restraining the
passions of both parties, he might prevent their dreaded

30

collision. He entirely succeeded in his endeavours, and at
the period of his death, the bright aspect of the political
horizon indicated no approaching storm.

Can any one look at that horizon now, and say that no
threatening clouds are to be seen ? Can any one now say
that we are in as favourable a position to effect the disper-
sion of such clouds as we were when Mr. Canning died-f*
Can any one assert that they are not of our own collecting?

" I have heard,

" And from men learned, that before the touch
" (The common, coarser touch) of good, or illj-r-
" That oftentimes a subtler sense informs
** Some spirits of the approach of ' things to be/ "

While Mr. Canning's expiring energies were exerting
themselves, as they had so long been, in anxious toil for his
country's welfare, and only a few hours before the perfect
brightness of his mental faculties was obscured by the
acuteness of his bodily sufferings, the last words which he
uttered on political affairs, were these : —

" I have laboured hard for the last few years to place the

^^ country in the high station which she now holds. Two

'^ years of the Duke of Wellington's Government will undo
" all that I have done."

The two years are now expired. Has the prophecy be^n
falsified by the event ?

FINIS,

I M> J*

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY